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N the 32 years which have passed since the beginning of interna-
tional airline operations in 1919, it has become apparent that flying
is the most expensive form of transportation and that scheduled serv-
ices are generally unable to survive without government subsidies.
Modern planes and navigational aids have increased safety and de-
creased operating costs to such an extent in the past decade, however,
that several companies may be carrying enough traffic and earning
.enough to become self-sufficient in the not too distant future. The
"Big Four" 1 American carriers have already done so. 2
But those U.S. operators are not typical of the airlines of the world,
for the "Big Four" are flying routes (a) of medium length (b) between
large metropolitan centers (c) in a rich populous country (d) with
highly developed commerce and industry and (e) a superior level of in-
come. The routes are frequently much shorter in Europe, and less eco-
nomical to operate.- The development of traffic has been inhibited by
the fact that air fares are higher than in the U.S.A. and average earnings
lower. There is also good cheap surface transportation which contin-
ues to provide real competition.
In addition, European flying services are competing with each other
for almost every country on the Continent has one or more airlines.
For over three decades, the problem of competition has been of pri-
mary importance to the airlines of Europe and the division of traffic has
been so painful economically that a number of methods have been tried
in efforts to minimize the "harmful effects of excessive competition."
While it is universally recognized that air transportation is an
industry so touched with national interest that it must be treated as a
1 American Airlines, Trans-World Airlines, Eastern Air Lines and United
Air Lines are the four largest U.S. domestic air transport operators.
2 D. W. Rentzel, Chairman, C.A.B., "The Current Position of American Air
Transportation," an address before the Aviation Writers Association in Washing-
ton, D. C., on January 11, 1951.
8 It is well recognized that certain routes are too short to permit the most
effective utilization of transport aircraft and crews.
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public utility, the question of just how much regulation and competi-
tion are desirable has yet to be resolved. Both governments and car-
riers have been concerned, and have resorted to a number of
arrangements to encourage "cooperation" and lessen the impact of
competition.
There have been many relationships between the airlines and be-
tween the governments and the carriers, ranging from agency and/or
inter-line agreements to the advanced consortium of the Scandinavian
Airlines System. They may all be described as forms of "cooperation,"
although some tend to retard the growth of air transport while others
open vast new vistas. In considering these miscellaneous stages on the
long road to international ownership and joint operations, it should be
kept in mind that most of the signatory companies were and are "cho-
sen instruments" with close economic and political support from their
governments. A rival operator reluctant to agree to such "coopera-
tion" might find it almost impossible to secure essential landing rights.
HISTORY OF THE POOLING ARRANGEMENTS
According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
"Historically, international cooperation in air transport seems
to have appeared initially and mainly in the form of commercial
cooperation, the purpose of which was not to eliminate competition
between airlines but rather to attempt to limit the unfavorable
repercussions of competition for both parties." 4
There are those who doubt whether it has achieved its purpose.
Among the most common forms of commercial cooperation has been
the "pool," an inter-carrier contract with a long history and wide use:
"These pooling arrangements are generally limited to commer-
cial matters: pooling of revenue in a common fund to be allocated in
proportion to the mileage flown, agreement on flight frequencies
and schedules, with the consequence that commercial and financial
services are performed in each country by the national airline on
behalf of the associate company.
"Pooling arrangements still permit a considerable amount of
competition and, therefore, only solve a small part of the problem;
nevertheless, in view of the economies made possible, and the fact
that they avoid dispersion of effort, and since experiments have
proved the effectiveness of the system, such arrangements deserve a
special place in the list of methods of international cooperation
which have already been tested." 5
Pool partners have consistently refused to make public the terms of
their carefully negotiated understandings lest the information be of
4 "Memorandum on International Ownership and Operation of Air Trans-
port" submitted to ICAO by France, A4-WP/8 EC/3 Appendix D March 1950,
p. 16.
5 Ibid, p. 17.
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assistance toother carriers. Additional light was cast on the pre-war
pools of Lufthansa 6 by a U.S. intelligence team which reported that:
".. . both revenues and expenses were pooled and subsequently pro-
rated based on several formulae, one of which involved the use of
'kilometers flown' as the basic yardstick. Another was based on the
number of seats made available although not necessarily used.
This pro-ration allowed an equitable distribution of both expenses
and revenue, and was a definite means employed in the control of
competitive operation." 7
It was not always possible to negotiate pool arrangements, for some
carriers refused to be forced into uneconomic "cooperation." An
example of this may be seen in the deal which Italy offered Britain two
decades ago. Imperial Airways sought permission to cross Italy en
route to India, and the Italian government asked in exchange landing
rights in Alexandria and
"demanded a pooling of the income, from both passenger and mail
traffic, for the whole route from England to India, of which pool the
Italian company was to receive one-half of the total. In the previ-
ous twenty-five weeks, the Italian company had not carried a single
paying passenger. The result of these extravagant demands was to
divert the route from Italy to central Europe." 8
Willingly in some cases and reluctantly in others, most European
airlines have entered into pools. The two big new carriers of the post-
war period, British European Airways and the Scandinavian Airlines
System, have been noticeably unenthusiastic about participating in
such restrictive arrangements and have given evidence of their confi-
dence in their ability to get along in free competition.
The pool is not limited to Europe, although it has found the great-
est acceptance on the Continent. It may be found in South America
too, where the Uruguayan carrier CAUSA is operating the Monte-
video-Buenos Aires route in pool with the Argentine airline ALFA 9
and the Colombian operator LANSA is running the Bogota-Caracas
service "in conjunction with LAV" 10 of Venezuela.
Although subject to a great deal of economic regulation as public
11 Tome 1, Revue Generale de Droit Airien (1932), p. 514 lists 15 of the pools
in which the Deutsche Lufthansa participated in a report on cooperation in civil
aviation.
T U.S. Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee study on "The German
Commercial Air Transport Industry and Related Aeronautical Developments and
Activities," available from H.M.S.O. London as Combined Intelligence Objectives
Sub-committee Item No. 25-28, p. 30.
s TOLLES, "A History of French Subsidies to Commercial Aviation," 161, Vol.
XVIII, Smith College Studies in History, July 1933.
" Foreign Air Transport Division, C.A.B., "Airlines of South America," April
5, 1949, p. 103.
10 Ibid, p. 79.
11 Among the inter-carrier agreements which must be filed with the C.A.B.
are those for "pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service, or equip-
ment."
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utilities, the United States airlines have not been barred by law from
pools. Indeed, Section 412 11 of the controlling Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 requires that pool contracts be filed with the Civil Aeronautics
Board and implies that such agreements are legal. Section 414 goes on
to exempt the airlines from anti-trust legislation. The U.S. carriers
have developed in the traditional American spirit of competition, 12 and
there are many observers who attribute their growth in large part to
such healthy contest. The C.A.B. has done its best to insure compli-
ance with the "Declaration of Policy" in Section 2 of the 1938 Act
which calls for "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense." The Board has also tried
to prevent "unfair or destructive competitive practices." 13
It might also be noted that British Overseas Airways Corporation is
engaged in joint operation with South African Airways between Lon-
don and Johannesburg 14 and with Qantas Empire Airways between
London and Australia.' 5 These arrangements are part of the long
range program for British air transport cooperation which has resulted
in the Commonwealth Air Transport Council I and its subsidiary
bodies.
A majority of the early pools 11 were purely inter-carrier deals, but
in recent years a number of governments have taken an increasing
interest in the economic affairs of the "chosen instrument" airlines
which they have been protecting and supporting. Several countries
have shown concern lest foreign operators flying to and through their
territories should offer too much capacity, i.e., run more services than
the normal traffic would justify, and take "too much" of the traffic.
12 The competition was particularly fierce before the Act of 1938, and re-
mains strong today in different forms.
13 Para. (c) of Sec. 2.
14 The study of South African Airways compiled by C.A.B. in 1946 reported
that "one of the important decisions reached at the Southern Africa Air Trans-
port Conference held in Capetown on March 20, 1945 was to establish an air serv-
ice between London and Johannesburg to be operated jointly by Great Britain and
the Union of South Africa with British aircraft."
15 "Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea," 10 Commonwealth Air
Transport Council Newsletter 3, 6-January, 1949.
16 "The Council was set up as a result of informal Commonwealth conversa-
tions in which representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, India, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom
participated, held in Montreal in October 1944 and continued in London in Decem-
ber the same year, when a resolution was passed in favor of constituting a Council
of a consultative nature to discuss matters affecting Civil Aviation of common
interest to the Commonwealth countries." CATC Doc. CIV, 23890, p. 1.
17 For a "sample" pool text, see Tome 1, Revue Generale de Droit Aerien
(1932), pp. 515-521. The Air Transport Bureau of ICAO has made a study of the
pre-war agreements, but has not released that document for public distribution.
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The Fifth Freedom 1s traffic has been a major source of disturbance, de-
spite the general acceptance of the Bermuda principles.' 9
France has been especially anxious about this question, and made it
clear in her November 9, 1949 report 20 to the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization:
"Most of the bilateral agreements concluded to date include special
provisions regarding the capacity to be operated on the services in
which both countries are interested.
"In certain of the agreements signed by France, special provisions
are included in respect of this matter for particular services.
"This is the case, for instance, with:
(1) the Franco-British Agreement of 28 February, 1946 for services
between Metropolitan France and the United Kingdom. This
agreement provides for arrangements to be agreed between Aero-
nautical Administrations for the determination of capacity to be
operated, and it specifies that: 'the frequency of the services, the
time-tables and in general the conditions under which services shall
be operated jointly and in pool by the designated airlines' are to be
determined by agreement between the companies,.
(2) the Franco-Portuguese Agreement of 30 April 1946 for services
connecting Metropolitan France and North Africa with Portugal
and for the regional colonial services in which both countries are
concerned.
This agreement provides for the same arrangements as above between
Aeronautical Administrations and between operating companies, but
provision is also made for the possibility of third countries operating
services on the routes involved, and it is specified that, if this occurs,
'the French and Portuguese airlines concerned may, with the approval
of their respective Aeronautical Authorities, conclude agreements with
the airline or airlines of such countries with a view to establishing pro-
cedures for cooperative operations based on similar principles.'
(3) the Franco-Irish Agreement of 16 May 1946 which provides for
arrangements between airlines with a view to the possibility of
'joint and pooled' operation of services between Paris and Dublin.
(4) the Franco-Swedish Agreement of 2 August 1946, modified on 22
April 1947, which provided for an initial joint examination by the
Aeronautical Authorities of both countries of 'the possibility of a
pooling arrangement between the companies operating on the
Stockholm-Paris and Stockholm-Malmoe-Copenhagen-Paris routes.'
Discussions to this effect took place in April 1947, with the participation
of the companies concerned, and both the French and Swedish Aeronau-
tical Authorities recognized in an exchange of letters dated 22 April
18 This is the term applied to the privilege granted to the carrier of one coun-
try to pick up traffic in a second nation on a reasonably direct line between the
homeland and a third country under Section 1 of Article I of the International Air
Transport Agreement prepared as Appendix IV to the Chicago Convention,
PICAO Doc. 2187, p. 71.
19 Signed by the U.K. and U.S. on February 11, 1946, the Final Act of the
Bermuda Conference sets forth the principle (6) that "capacity should be related:
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of des-
tination; (b) to the requirements of through airline operations, and (c) to the
traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking ac-
count of local and regional services."
20 "Memorandum on International Ownership and Operation of Air Trans-
port" A4-WP/8 EC/3 Appendix D 24 March 1950, pp. 18-19.
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1947 that they had 'taken cognizance of the expressed intention of the
airlines ... to conclude an agreement with a view to setting up joint
operations, due consideration being given to economic traffic data.'
(5) the Franco-Italian Agreement of 3 February 1949, which provides
for an understanding between the airlines designated to operate
services between France and Italy on the routes specified in the
agreement, this understanding 'to take into consideration the capac-
ity to be operated by each of the airlines, and accordingly to deter-
mine the frequency of services, the allocation of schedules, and, in
general, the manner in which operations are to be conducted.'"
A joint Standing Franco-Italian Committee has been established to
monitor traffic and implement the capacity clauses, and there is a simi-
lar body to discuss capacity problems with the United Kingdom.
Great Britain was a signatory to the Bermuda Agreement, and has not
been too enthusiastic about France's insistence on such capacity con-
trols. The United States has been even less willing to accept such
restrictions on the operations of T.W.A. and Pan American World Air-
ways to and through Paris, as has been clear in the recent Franco-Amer-
ican negotiations for revision.of the bilateral agreement between those
governments.
But Italy has been pursuing a policy similar to that of France, and
has withheld permanent permits for certain airlines that were not will-
ing to "cooperate," i.e., pool with Italian carriers. Italy's utilization of
the concept of capacity controls has been much less reasonable than
that of France, and can probably be attributed to the concern of civil
aviation officials in Rome over the post-war weakness of the Italian air-
lines. The Swiss have been busy protecting their ambitious carrier,
taking advantage of their geographical position athwart the route to the
Mediterranean and Asia to force through-north-south operators into
pools with Swissair.
JOINT UNIFORM FARES AND CHARGES
Another form of "cooperation" is the rate-fixing agreement, a pre-
war practice which was institutionalized with the creation of the Inter-
national Air Transport Association in Havana in April, 1945. All the
important scheduled airlines outside the Soviet orbit now develop joint
uniform passenger fares and freight charges at the three annual re-
gional traffic conferences 21 of that trade association. These rates are
subject to the approval of the governments, which accept the device of
the traffic conference as a time-tested method of avoiding certain eco-
nomic and political problems in publicly regulated transportation.
IATA provides the airlines with a private forum for discussion of inter-
national fares and charges, while the carriers deal with their own gov-
ernments in establishing fares for domestic services.
It should be noted that there are both advantages and disadvantages
in setting rates in traffic conference, a system with a long maritime his-
21 See J. G. Gazdik, "International Rate-Making," 9 IATA Bulletin 61, July
1949.
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tory. Although subsidy-supported rate wars are avoided and their
nasty political by-products eliminated, some of the incentives present in
free competition are also absent. The rates and charges are often based
on the operating costs of the less efficient carriers, and it may take a
long time to achieve the reductions made possible by modern aircraft,
efficient organization and good cost control systems. Some of the air-
lines outside IATA argue that it is based on ','cartel thinking," while
the member carriers point out that all kinds of transport rates are set by
public utility commissions and traffic bodies in many countries.
In considering IATA, one might also take into account the great
amount of technical cooperation which the members achieve through
that trade association of scheduled carriers in international service. In
addition, there are the important technical annexes of ICAO which
have done so much to achieve standardization of operating procedures,
rules of the air, etc.
"In listing examples of cooperation, it is interesting to note
that, in the field of international operations, a number of airlines
have made their own facilities available to other operators over the
same route. An instance of this is the hotel accommodation pro-
vided by Trans-Canada Airlines at Goose Bay, the operating cost of
which is shared by other airlines using the airport as a stopping
place. Another example is the Pan American Airways G.C.A. blind
landing aid which is available to all airlines operating through Gan-
der.
"The establishment of International Aeradio, Ltd. is another
interesting example of cooperative spirit. The services provided by
this Organization in countries where adequate air safety could not
otherwise be provided are a good illustration of the value of collec-
tive effort.
"It is particularly desirable that joint efforts should be exerted
also in the field of airway facilities, including airports, so as to im-
prove facilities available and to save Governments useless expendi-
ture ... In this connection, France and Switzerland have built an
international airport at Bale-Mulhouse ... 22
The benefits to be derived from technical cooperation, such as the
vital ICAO program for joint support of weather stations on the North
Atlantic and airway facilities, have been obvious to both carriers and
governments for some time. A good deal of important progress has
22 Opus cit., note 20, p. 20. "The airport was established by the French and
Swiss Governments as a public corporation. It is located on French territory and
is controlled by a Council half of whose members are French and the other half
Swiss. The Council is assisted by a Director and an Airport Manager (command-
ant d'aerodrome) with various subordinate officers.
"The French Government has made available to the airport those facilities
which already existed and has agreed further to acquire and make available what-
ever land may be required for the airport or its facilities, as defined in the agree-
ment. The Swiss Government, on the other hand, agrees to bear a portion, to be
determined, of the capital expenditures.
"The public corporation is responsible for the operation of the facilities, but
technical services, such as radio, flight control and ground control, are provided by
the Governments themselves on a basis of allocation to be defined. Airline traffic,
health, customs and immigration services are also provided by the States them-
selves, each one acting on its own behalf."
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been the result of combined efforts to resolve technical problems.
Cooperation in the realm of economic and political aspects of inter-
national civil aviation has moved more slowly, for the issues are infi-
nitely more complex. Inter-governmental efforts since the Chicago
Conference of 1944 have not been too successful in the multilateral
sphere and most countries are currently concentrating on bilateral
pacts. The airlines, however, have proceeded to develop a number of
interesting and varied relationships as they have realized that interna-
tional cooperation need not be limited to attempts to soften the impact
of "excessive" competition.
These arrangements have ranged from the simple contract which
T.W.A. has to manage Saudi Arabian Airlines 23 to the advanced new
scheme for international ownership planned by S.A.S. Some 10% of
the stock of Iranian Airlines has been held by T.W.A. which also has a
contract to manage that company. It is not unusual for one airline to
have shareholdings in another,24 with the extent of the investment
determined by the objectives. A carrier may buy some stock with the
thought of later expanding its holdings into control, or one airline may
acquire such a big block of the other's securities that the purchaser has
control. In 1947, the C.A.B. reported 25 that Pan American held be-
tween 20% and 100% of 17 foreign airlines and that T.W.A. had
investments of between 10%/ and 40%/ in 7 others. B.E.A. and
B.O.A.C. also have large holdings in widely scattered associated and
subsidiary carriers.
Of course, a big share-holder will have a man on the Board of Direc-
tors to influence long-range policy and may also have a representative in
the day-to-day management. These arrangements have been common
in the Pan American subsidiaries in Latin America. 26  B.E.A. owns
40%/ of the Alitalia company and keeps a "Resident Director" in Rome
to guide policy; the two carriers work together very closely. The other
important Italian airline, L.A.I., is basically under the control of
T.W.A. which holds 40%/ of the shares and plays an active role in the
day-to-day management. It is generally felt that both B.E.A. and
T.W.A. have made significant contributions to the recovery of Italian
civil aviation and that this type of cooperative venture should be
encouraged.
(To be continued)
23 Wholly owned by the government of Saudi Arabia.
24 In general, see the "Survey on Ownership of Airlines," ICAO Doe. 4953-
AT/633, February 1948.
25 Exhibit 35 of April, May 1947, Hearings on Overseas Air Transportation
by Steamship Operators or a Consolidated Air Carrier before the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, pp. 1350-51.
26 It is not always easy to determine the amount of influence exercised by the
parent company, and Pan American has never hesitated to deny that it has control
if such a statement were convenient.
